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SUMMARY
This study adopts a new approach in assessing the impact of taxes on small business growth
and suggests the need to consider new incentives that would be more effective in encouraging
small business growth and would also improve the neutrality of the existing tax system.  
In recent years, federal and provincial governments have provided various corporate tax
incentives to small businesses with the aim of helping them grow. While it is commonly
believed that small businesses are responsible for most job creation, unfortunately the only
study available has shown that while many small businesses are created, few grow. Yet many
governments believe that the incentives are important even though little evidence supports the
effectiveness of small business corporate concessions. Some provinces have actually eliminated
corporate taxes on small businesses or reduced such taxes to a symbolic level (e.g., one to two
percent) without there being any empirical support in favour of the effectiveness of such
actions.
In contradiction to the widely held view that small business tax concessions encourage growth,
such small business tax relief could actually be antithetical to growth by creating a “taxation
wall.” First, it could result in the breakup of companies into smaller, less efficient-sized units in
order to take advantage of tax benefits even if there are economic gains to growing in size.
Second, it could encourage individuals to create small corporations in order to reduce their
personal tax liabilities rather than grow companies.  And third, it could lead to a “threshold
effect” that holds back small business from growing beyond the official definition of
“smallness,” regardless of the criteria for measuring size (e.g., the size of revenue or assets, or
the number of employees). 
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of both corporate and personal taxes on the growth of
small business and we focus in particular on the likely consequences of the aforementioned
threshold effect. We use a new approach in assessing the impact of taxes on small business
growth by estimating the amount of tax paid on the rate of return to capital as a small business
grows in size. We show that small business growth is hampered by the existing tax system. As
a business grows, effective tax rates on capital investments made by entrepreneurs virtually
double when the business grows from as a little as $1 million to over $30 million in asset size.
The issue is particularly important to the provinces that have been creating greater gaps
between large and small business tax rates.
The aim of tax incentives should be to try to avoid creating a wall that inhibits growth in small
businesses, but instead flattens corporate and personal taxes with respect to incentives
structured to induce growth. We provide some specific recommendations for growth-enhancing
incentives that are superior to the small business tax deduction and other incentives of a similar
type. Incentives associated with size should be avoided as much as possible, a proposal that is
consistent with International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations.
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INTRODUCTION
Canadian governments should be praised for their coordinated efforts in reforming our business
tax system. This reform has significantly improved tax neutrality across industries for large
firms mainly through unifying and lowering corporate income tax rates, eliminating the capital
tax, harmonizing sales taxes and better matching the capital cost allowance with the economic
depreciation rate.
One of the underlying goals of the aforementioned reforms is to neutralize the tax distortion
between corporations of different sizes. The Technical Committee on Business Taxation
(hereafter the Mintz Committee) pointed out that a variety of preferential tax measures towards
small business “represent a notable departure from a neutral tax system, and give Canadian-
owned smaller corporations one of the most favored income tax regimes in the world relative
to the general tax system.” The Mintz Committee suggested that “it may be more appropriate
to reduce the general corporate tax rate (and thus the differential between the effective general
and small business rates) rather than increasing the amount of income to which reduced federal
and provincial rates apply,” because reducing the general tax rate “would both reduce existing
distortions and incentives for tax planning associated with the small business deduction and
improve incentives to invest in business generally.”1
Unfortunately, tax changes in recent years with respect to small businesses deductions did not
heed the advice from the Mintz Committee. Over the past decade, both the federal and
provincial governments have more than doubled the income threshold for the small business
deduction from $200,000 to $500,000 (on an inflation-adjusted basis from $350,000 to
$500,000). These changes took place despite the Mintz Committee’s view that “a higher-
income threshold would not be consistent with the focus on assisting truly small businesses”
because “over 80 percent of small businesses (that claimed the tax deduction) earn less than
$100,000 in income.” Furthermore, some provinces have reduced the tax rate for small
business more aggressively than they have reduced the general corporate income tax rate.
Among the latter provinces, Prince Edward Island reduced the tax rate for small business to
one percent but did nothing for larger businesses, and Manitoba eliminated the tax for small
business completely (see Table 1 below). British Columbia has poposed to reduce the
provincial small business tax rate to zero. As a result, the tax distortion between large and
small firms in these provinces has worsened. 
The main argument for taxing small businesses more favourably is to compensate for their
limited access to capital financing—a disadvantage often attributed to market failure. Other
supporting arguments include excessive compliance costs and cash flow concerns facing small
business. But tax measures in general are not an effective remedy for non-tax disadvantages
incurred by any long-term business undertaking. More specifically, as suggested in a recent
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study,2 “preferential       
1 Canada: Technical Committee on Business Taxation, Report, 1997, Ottawa: Finance Canada (available at
www.fin.gc.ca), Chapter 5.
2 See Asa Johansson, Christopher Heady, Jens Arnold, Bert Brys and Laura Vartia, “Tax and Economic Growth,”
OECD, ECO/WKP(2008)28.
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tax treatment of or exemptions from corporate taxation for small firms are not likely to be
justified.” This is because 
investment decisions of small firms do not appear to be more sensitive to
corporate taxes than those of large firms – indeed evidence points to the
opposite…Thus, special tax reliefs based on firm size could result in economic
inefficiencies as resources may be wasted. Cutting back on these exemptions frees
resources for cuts in the overall statutory corporate tax rate, which were found to
be beneficial for enhancing economic growth by favouring high return and rapidly
catching up firms and industries.
In contradiction to the widely held view that small business tax concessions encourage growth,
such small business tax relief could be antithetical to growth for three reasons. 
First, it could result in the breakup of companies into smaller ones in order to take advantage
of tax benefits, which results in giving up economic gains from growing in size to take
advantage of economies of scale. While there are “associated corporation rules” that require the
small business deduction to be allocated among corporations jointly owned, many
circumstances enable companies to break up to take advantage of low corporate tax relief.3
This leads to less efficient companies operating in the economy.  A recent paper suggests that
one of the factors explaining Canada’s low rate of productivity compared to the United States
is that the Canadian distribution of firms is skewed more to small size.4
Second, many small business are created to enable individuals to reduce personal tax rather
than grow companies—the small business tax relief thereby distorts the choice between
corporate and unincorporated business organization even though some compliance and
administrative costs are incurred to operate in the corporate form. With corporate organization,
it is easier to split income among family members holding shares of a corporation. Also,
income reinvested in the corporation is taxed at preferential rates compared to partnership and
sole proprietorships whose income is fully taxed as personal income earned by the owner. One
of the few studies focused on this issue showed that the corporate tax imposes much higher
economic costs by distorting decisions with respect to the choice of organizational form.5
While earlier results would suggest that the distortionary cost of corporate taxation per dollar
of revenue is in the five to 13 cent range, the efficiency costs estimated by Gravelle and
Kotlikoff are between 84 cents and $1.51 of corporate revenues for similar parameter values. 
Third, the well known problem with preferential tax treatment targeting small business,
regardless of the criteria for defining smallness, is its negative “threshold effect” on growth.
That is, whether smallness is defined by the size of assets, revenue or taxable income, or the
number of employees, there is always a point beyond which the beneficiary firm may stop
growing simply to preserve the tax savings associated with the definition of smallness.
3 See V. Pinero, “Whatever Partnerships Do…. Joint Ventures do Better,” mimeograph, 2011.
4 The analysis suggests that 20 percent of the Canadian-US difference between sales per employee is explained by the
greater small business sector in Canada. D. Leung, C. Mez, Y. Terajima, “Productivity in Canada: Does Firm Size
Matter?” Bank of Canada Review, Autumn, 2008, 5-14.
5 J. Gravelle, J. and L. Kotlikoff, “The Incidence and Efficiency Cost of Corporate Taxation when Corporate and Non-
Corporate Forms Produce the Same Good,” WP/88/32, Washington D. C. International Monetary Fund, 1988.
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In dealing with this threshold effect, developed countries have taken different approaches.
In contrast to Canada, where governments have raised the income threshold for the small
business deduction, all the other 11 OECD countries except the United Kingdom that tax small
business favourably set an income threshold much lower than that in Canada.6 Among these
other OECD countries, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom have raised the small business
tax rate to shrink the rate gap between small and large firms, which is also in contrast to many
Canadian provinces that reduced their tax rates for small business faster than for large firms.7
In fact, some researchers in the UK strongly advocate the removal of the reduced tax rate for
small business, for which they see little economic justification.8 Since 2000, federal reductions
in the general corporate tax rate in Canada have reduced the difference between large and small
business tax rates.9
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of both corporate and personal taxes on the growth of
small businesses and we focus in particular on the likely consequences of creating a “taxation
wall” that impedes economic growth. We use a new approach in assessing the impact of taxes
on small business growth by estimating the amount of tax paid on the rate of return to capital
as a small business grows in size. We will show below that small business growth is hampered
by the existing tax system. As a business grows, effective tax rates on capital investments made
by entrepreneurs virtually double when the business grows from as a little as $1 million to over
$30 million in asset size. This is not unlike the “taxation wall” in the personal income tax
system whereby individuals who choose to work more face higher marginal tax rates that
undermine their incentive to earn higher income. The question we ask is how to deal with this
“taxation wall?” Should we remove it completely or relocate it to encourage more businesses
to stay within the “wall?”  
Despite claims that small businesses are responsible for much job creation, there are few
studies to support such claims. One Canadian study in 1997 showed that only 12 percent of
small businesses grew from having less than five employees to 5-19.9 employees and only one
percent grew to having more than 20 employees from 1985 to 199210 despite the large number
of small business corporations created during that time. In our view, it is critical that the
federal and provincial governments should undertake the equivalent of a “tax expenditure”
analysis to determine the effectiveness of current incentives to small business since so little
evidence is available to support them.
Our analysis questions the effectiveness of the small business deduction and other small business
incentives in addressing growth. Instead, we find that the incentives undermine the neutrality of
the overall tax system and the tax goals of simplification, economic efficiency and fairness.
6 For an early review of small business tax incentives, see Duanjie Chen, Frank Lee and Jack Mintz, “Taxation, SMEs
and Entrepreneurship,” Organization of Cooperation and Development, STI Working Paper 2002/9, Paris, France,
2002.
7 Refer to OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org), Tables II.1 and II.2, for more details. 
8 See for instance, Claire Crawford and Judith Freedman, “Small Business Taxation, A Special Study of the Structural
Issues Surrounding the Taxation of Business Profits of Owner Managed Firms," 6th August 2008,
http://www.ifs.org.uk/mirrleesreview/press_docs/small_businesses.pdf.
9 The federal and provincial governments have eliminated most capital taxes that also favoured small businesses.
10 See K. Hendricks, R. Amit and D. Whistler (1997), Business Taxation of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in
Canada, Department of Finance Working Paper 97-11, Government of Canada, Ottawa and Report of the Technical
Committee on Business Taxation (Finance Canada, Ottawa, 1997) p. 5.2.
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While specific incentives for small business simply complicate the tax system, policy may still
be used to address concerns regarding the difficulty small businesses have in tapping credit and
stock markets relative to the ease with which large multinationals obtain funds.11 Tax
incentives should focus on growth, not on creating barriers to growth.  A recent report by the
IMF suggests: “…the best response to market failures that may adversely affect [small medium
enterprises] is unlikely to be through size-related tax measures.”12 We concur with that view.
One example would be the expensing of capital up to a limit for all businesses to encourage
growth through investment. Such an incentive would offer more benefits to smaller companies
that want to grow rather than those whose principal purpose is to reduce personal income taxes
on business income. A second reform would be to introduce capital gains tax relief for
companies that go public, an incentive used in the US to grow companies (to be discussed in
more detail later). A third measure would be to broaden existing measures to reduce the lock-in
effect of capital gains taxes so as to allow entrepreneurs and investors to replace existing assets
with new ones on a deferral basis. We recommend a formal capital gains deferral account
similar to that proposed by Mintz and Wilson.13
The rest of this paper is structured in four sections. We first outline the types of incentives used
in the tax system for small business investment in Canada. This is followed by a description of
the basic model used to estimate the impact of taxes on small business investment. We then
apply this model to an examination of the impact of corporate and personal taxes on the
incentive for entrepreneurs to invest in small businesses as they grow in size. This examination
is enriched by simulations of various business scenarios (e.g., different profit ratios, debt-to-
asset ratios and dividend payout ratios). The final section discusses policy implications of our
analysis and concludes with policy recommendations. 
SMALL BUSINESS TAXATION IN CANADA 
For decades, Canada has provided a special tax regime for small business to relieve them of
taxes to be paid to federal and provincial governments. The legal form of “small business” that
qualifies for small business deduction is Canadian-controlled private corporations (CCPC).
Under the small business deduction (hereafter SBD), a CCPC is entitled to a reduced corporate
income tax rate on its first $500,000 of active business income if its “taxable capital,” as
defined under the federal Income Tax Act (Part I.3), does not exceed $10 million. The federal
SBD is reduced progressively on a straight-line basis for CCPCs when their taxable capital
increases from $10 million to $15 million and no SBD is available once their “taxable capital”
exceeds $15 million. Most of the provinces have provided similar treatment for small business
although corporate rates and thresholds differ by province. In the case of Ontario, the surtax on
small business income above the threshold (a clawback of the small business deduction) was
eliminated in the 2009 Budget. Table 1 provides a summary of the statutory corporate income
tax rate and corresponding income threshold for SBD in years 1997, 2005, 2008 and 2010. 
11 According to Claire Crawford and Judith Freedman (note 8), there is no evidence of any general capital market
failure in the UK, and the principal finance gap is for new and start-up businesses rather than small businesses.
12 International Tax Dialogue, “Taxation of Small and Medium Businesses,” prepared by staff of the IMF with input
from staff of the other organizations participating in the ITD (the Inter-American Development Bank, OECD and
World Bank), October 2007.
13 Jack Mintz and Thomas A. Wilson, “Removing the Shackles: Deferring Capital Gains Taxes on Asset Rollovers,”
C.D. Howe Institute Backgrounder, Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, April, 2006.
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Further reductions in the general corporate tax rate will occur at the federal level by 2012 with
the difference between the large and small business rate being 15 and 11 percent respectively. 
As shown in Table 1, the trend in many provinces is that the SBD has become more and more
generous with the reduced tax rate being further reduced and the income threshold for such
reduced tax rates being more than doubled. While the federal government and a few provinces
attempted to strike a balance by cutting the general corporate tax rate more aggressively than
that for small business, many provinces went to the other extreme to dramatically reduce (e.g.,
PEI) or eliminate the tax rate for small business entirely (e.g., Manitoba by 2012). 
Against the trend of enhancing the SBD in many cases, New Brunswick reversed such
enhancement in its sweeping tax reform of 2008. The 2008 tax reform introduced a plan for
reducing the general corporate income tax rate from 13 percent to eight percent by 2012 and
keeping the reduced rate of five percent for small business (which is partially restored from the
1.5% rate that applied in 2007) unchanged.  Although the current New Brunswick government
now plans to only reduce the corporate tax rate to 10 percent and to reintroduce the tax
reduction for small business, the gap between the two rates narrows from 11 percentage points
in 2005 to five percentage points for 2011, which is the least for all provinces except for
Quebec. In Quebec, this rate gap is under four percentage points but there was no such rate gap
back in 2005.
TABLE 1: Small Business Deduction (SBD): Tax Rate and Revenue Threshold*
* Effective at the end of year. According to the latest budget plans, by 2012, the federal general corporate income tax rate
will fall to 15 percent (the small business rate remains 11 percent resulting in a 4-point spread). The Ontario general
corporate income tax rate falls to 10 percent (the small business rate will be 5.5 points below that). The New Brunswick
general corporate income tax rate will fall to 10 percent and small business rate to 4.5 percent. The small corporate
income tax rate will be further reduced to four percent in Nova Scotia (11 points below the general rate), 2.5% in
Saskatchewan (9.5 points below the provincial general rate) and possibly zero in BC (10 points below the provincial
general rate).
Sources:
1. Deloitte, Corporate income tax rates, 2005-2012 (updated to January 31, 2010).
2. PriceWaterHouseCoopers, Tax Facts and Figures: Canada 2010.
3. Ernst & Young, Tax Alert, http://www.ey.com/CA/en/Services/Tax/Tax-Alerts
3. For New Brunswick, http://www.gnb.ca/0024/tax/index.asp
4. For 1997, Report of the Technical Committee on Business Taxation, page 2.2.
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Federal 13.12 / 29.12 13.12 / 22.12 11 / 19.5 11 / 18 -2.1 / -11.1 $200 $300 $400 $500
NFLD 5 / 14 5 / 14 5 / 14 4 / 14 -1 / 0 $200 $300 $400 $500
P.E.I. 7.5 / 16 6.5 / 16 3.2 / 16 1 / 16 -6.5 / 0 $200 $300 $400 $500
N.S. 5 / 16 5 / 16 5 / 16 5 / 16 0 / 0 $200 $350 $400 $400
N.B. 7 / 17 2 / 13 5 / 13 5 / 11 -2 / -6 $200 $450 $400 $500
QUE. 5.91 / 9.15 8.9 / 8.9 8 / 11.9 8 / 11.9 + 2.1 /+ 2.8 $200 $400 $400 $500
ONT. 9.5 / 15.5 5.5 / 14 5.5 / 14 4.5 / 12 -5 / -3.5 $200 $400 $500 $500
MAN. 9 / 17 5 / 15 2 / 13 0 / 12 -9 / -5 $200 $400 $400 $400
SASK. 8 /17 5 / 17 4.5 / 12 4.5 / 12 -2.5 / -5 $200 $300 $500 $500
ALTA. 6 / 15.5 3 / 11.5 3 / 10 3 / 10 -3 / -5.5 $200 $400 $460 $500
B.C. 9 / 16.5 4.5 / 12 2.5 / 11 2.5 / 10.5 -6.5 / -6 $200 $400 $400 $500
YUKON 6 / 15 4 / 15 4 / 15 4 / 15 -2 / 0 $200 $400 $400 $400
N.W.T. 5 / 14 4 / 14 4 / 11.5 4 / 11.5 -1 / -2.5 $200 $300 $400 $500
NUV NA 4 / 12 4 / 12 4 / 12 0 / 0 NA $300 $400 $500
Corporate income tax rate (%): reduced vs. general Revenue threshold
($000) for SBD
1997 2005 2008 2010 Change in 1997 2005    2008   2010 
% point
Besides the small business deduction related to taxing income at the firm level, the other two
main components of the small business tax regime are related to taxation of dividends and
capital gains from small business within personal income taxation.
- Dividend Taxes: The dividend tax rate varies by income and credit rate. Investors pay
personal income tax on dividends but are given a dividend tax credit as an offset for
corporate taxes deducted from profits. Therefore, the purpose of the dividend tax credit
given to shareowners of a corporation is to compensate them for the corporate tax deducted
from profits prior to the distribution of dividends. Under the dividend tax credit regime in
Canada, a low dividend tax credit is provided for “ineligible” dividends distributed from
earnings taxed at the reduced business tax rate while a high dividend tax credit is provided
for “eligible” dividends paid from profits subject to the general corporate income tax rate.
When the corporation grows in asset size or earns more profits, its corporate income tax
rate jumps. This higher corporate income tax rate is offset by a larger dividend tax credit
given to the shareholders, resulting in a lower personal tax on dividends. This implies that
the personal income tax rate on dividends shifts down when a small business expands and
moves from paying a low to a high corporate income tax rate.
- Lifetime Capital Gains Exemption: The first $750,000 of capital gains on qualifying
shares held in Canadian-controlled businesses (as well as capital gains from farm and
fishing property) is exempt from personal income tax (there is no explicit limit on firm size
but most CCPCs are small companies). Thus, as a business grows, the entrepreneur is
subject to capital gains tax when the business becomes sufficiently large to exceed this
threshold. Since capital gains taxes are applied when shares are sold (rather than as gains
accrue), we shall calculate an accrual-equivalent capital gains tax rate under the assumption
that shares in small businesses are on average held for 20 years. To the extent that shares
are held for fewer (more) years, the accrual-equivalent capital gains tax rate is higher
(lower). If the accrual-equivalent capital gains tax rate is higher in value, the impact of the
lifetime capital gains exemption becomes more severe in impeding growth.
The above three aspects of the tax system—the small business deduction, dividend taxes and
the lifetime capital gains exemption—are modeled. There are other tax provisions listed in
Appendix A that also provide benefits to small businesses but are not incorporated in the model
at this point primarily due to lack of data. These include the following: 
• A research and development credit that is richer for small CCPCs compared to large ones.
Small firms are provided a federal credit equal to 35 percent of research and development
expenditure while larger companies are provided a lower credit equal to 20 percent of such
expenditure. Further, the higher credit rate for small businesses is phased out between
$10 million and $50 million in expenditures. Similar to the small business tax deduction,
the differential credit rates also act as a “taxation wall” for innovative companies.
• Capital gains deferral for entrepreneurs selling firms so long as proceeds are reinvested in
another small business.
• Special personal tax provisions for CCPCs with respect to the deduction of losses on the
disposal of shares and favourable treatment of capital gains on stock options. Similar to the
lifetime capital gains exemption that apply to all CCPCs, these provisions are not explicitly
limited to thresholds related to firm size, but primarily benefit small businesses that make
up the majority of CCPCs.
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• Tax relief measures under the federal Goods and Services Tax (GST) and Harmonized Sales
Tax (HST) that exempt companies with less than $30,000 in sales from collecting such
taxes and the Quick Method for remitting GST and HST sales taxes (allowing small
business to keep some of the revenue in lieu of claims for input tax credits).
• An exemption below a specified payroll ceiling from provincial payroll taxes.  
In the case of the latter two incentives, they would not be relevant to the decision to invest in
capital, but they do impact on employee hiring and production decisions. Our model focuses on
the investment incentives.  
A MODEL TO ESTIMATE THE IMPACT OF TAXATION ON SMALL BUSINESS GROWTH 
Most recent studies of business taxation in Canada have focused on multinational companies,
which are assumed to raise capital in international markets.14 In these studies, personal tax
rates paid by Canadians have a negligible impact on the cost of debt and equity financing since
Canada only accounts for a small share of such capital raised in international markets.  
In the case of small business, entrepreneurs provide the major source of equity finance for their
small business and typically obtain debt finance from lending institutions. Thus personal taxes
on entrepreneurial income (dividend and capital gains taxes), and not just corporate income
taxes, play a significant role in affecting the cost of financing raised by small business. On the
other hand, banks and other financial lenders to small business operate on an international
scale so that personal taxes have little effect on the interest rate charged on debt finance raised
in international credit markets.
The marginal effective tax rate (METR) calculated for this study is based on an entrepreneur
investing his savings in the equity of the business (it is assumed that debt is provided by banks
and other lending institutions). It is calculated as the difference between the pre-tax rate of
return on capital and the net of corporate and personal tax of return on capital. The
entrepreneur will invest in equity until the after-tax rate of return on incremental investment is
equal to the net-of-tax return that could be earned on alternative investments, adjusted for risk.
The cost of debt finance is the interest rate charged in the market for debt as provided by banks
and other lenders. See Appendix C for an elaboration of the model’s theoretical analysis.
For example, ignoring debt finance, if the pre-tax (net-of-risk) rate of return on capital is 10
percent and the corporate tax rate is 20 percent, the profit rate to owner, net of corporate taxes,
is eight percent. If the personal tax rate on profits derived from the business is 30 percent, the
net-of-tax rate of return on investment is equal to 5.6 percent (8(1 - 0.3) = 5.6). If the after-tax
return on equity is sufficiently high so as to reward the entrepreneur for investing in the
business rather than in other opportunities (after netting out risk), the project will be
undertaken.  
14 Chen, Duanjie and Jack Mintz, Canada’s Tax Competitiveness After A Decade of Reforms Still an Unfinished Plan,
The School of Public Policy, SPP Papers, May 2010, http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/TaxCorp.pdf
and Finance Canada, Tax Expenditures and Evaluations 2008, Part 2 - Research Report: Considerations in Setting
Canada’s Corporate Income Tax Rate, http://www.fin.gc.ca/taxexp-depfisc/2008/taxexp08_4-eng.asp#Considerations.
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When the METR is calculated for the entrepreneur, the annualized value of corporate taxes
(the corporate income tax rate and provisions for cost deductions, sales taxes on capital
purchases and capital-based taxes) and personal tax on equity income (personal income taxes
on dividends and capital gains) is calculated as a percentage of the pre-tax return earned on
investments. In other words, an entrepreneur is responsible for paying taxes at both the firm
level and the personal level, all of which contribute to the tax wedge or METR on small
business.  
The METR on entrepreneurial investments in small business is estimated below as a business
grows in asset size. For example, with a given pre-tax profit rate and a given dividend payout
ratio, as dividends increase along with capital size and revenue, the personal tax rate on
dividends rises. When either the capital or taxable income crosses the threshold defining the
SBD, the corporate income tax rate rises and the personal tax rate on dividends shifts down. In
the model, we also assume financial policies do not change as a small business grows. If they
do change, it would have tax and non-tax effects on profitability, but at the margin will not
impact the overall cost of capital. However, it is possible that businesses facing a higher
corporate income tax rate might choose financial policies to avoid its impact, which is not
explicitly modeled below. 
In calculating METR for small business, compared to that for large firms, several assumptions
warrant special attention. 
First, the debt-to-asset ratio for small business is assumed to be much lower than that used for
large firms. Based on statistics for non-financial firms with annual revenue under $5 million,
the debt-to-asset ratio assumed for small firms is about 29 percent (Appendix B). This is far
lower than the 40 percent debt-to-asset ratio assumed in our study of large firms. The
underlying fact is that, in general, the smaller the firm, the lower the debt-to-asset ratio. This
lower debt-to-asset ratio could be a result of weaker borrowing power by small firms or fewer
corporate tax benefits arising from increased interest deductions associated with leverage.
Second, the assumption for the pre-tax profit ratio (profits divided by assets) is critical to
calculating METR for small business but irrelevant to that for large firms. This is because
under the SBD, the reduced corporate income tax rate is restricted to firms having certain
capital and revenue sizes. For a given capital size for SBD, only a given pre-tax profit ratio
makes it possible to gauge which tax rate—the general one or the reduced one—should be used
in the model. That is, our model is first set up based on capital size, which, when combined
with a pre-tax profit rate, gives taxable income based on which the tax rate can be assigned.
Again, based on the Statistics Canada data (Appendix B) available to us, the average pre-tax
profit rate for non-financial firms with revenue under $5 million was five percent in 2004-6.
This five percent pre-tax profit rate is assumed as the base case for our calculation. Simulations
for different profit rates will be presented later. 
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THE THRESHOLD EFFECT ON METR FOR SMALL BUSINESS 
The threshold effect arising from the preferential tax treatment for small business is commonly
observed as a turning point in the tax impact on firm growth. In the case of Canada’s SBD, the
threshold is $500,000 in taxable income, or $10 million in “taxable capital,” whichever
threshold is exceeded first. The lifetime capital gains exemption introduces another threshold
as equity investment by the entrepreneur in the company grows in value as the firm increases
in size. These threshold effects can be illustrated by our METR calculation.
The base case in our METR model is assumed to have a five percent pre-tax profit ratio, a
29 percent debt-to-asset ratio and a 40 percent dividend payout ratio for 2010. Figure 1
presents the Canada-wide average METR for small business as a base case, and Figure 2
further provides the 10 provincial counterparts to the base case. Figure 3 simulates the average
Canada-wide METR with different income thresholds for SBD ranging from $200,000 (the
1997 level) to $500,000 (the level since 2009) to see whether such variation has helped
alleviate the threshold effect. And Figures 4-6 provide further simulations by varying the pre-
tax profit rate, the dividend payout ratio and the debt-to-asset ratio, respectively.
A. The Canada-Wide Pattern
As Figure 1 shows, with a pre-tax profit ratio of five percent, the METR on a small business
jumps after capital size exceeds $10 million, corresponding to which capital size the taxable
income exceeds $500,000—the revenue threshold for the SBD. At this turning point, the
METR is 27.5 percent.  
Below this threshold, the METR rises gradually (from the low of 18 percent) as dividends paid
to the owner grow. This rise in the METR especially at low asset values results from income
becoming subject to higher personal taxes under the progressive tax rate structure. Other tax
factors contributing to the gradual upward creep in the METR include the existing residual
provincial capital taxes that kick in at different levels of total assets (e.g., $2 million in Quebec
and $6 million in Nova Scotia) and the lower income threshold (i.e., $400,000) for SBD in
Manitoba and Nova Scotia (see below in Figure 2). The provincial capital taxes will all be
eliminated by 2012.
After the turning point with the 27.5 percent METR, the national METR on small business
jumps by almost eight percentage points to 35.3 percent. While the higher dividend tax credit
rate mitigates the impact of a higher corporate income tax rate, retained profits are subject to
higher corporate taxes when the corporation grows beyond $10 million in asset size. This
higher METR of 35.3 percent stabilizes until the capital size reaches $36 million, when small
business exhausts its lifetime exemption for $750,000 in capital gains and hence will pay
capital gains tax. The capital gains tax rate at this point is assumed to be the top personal
capital gains tax calculated on an accrual basis, which contributes to a jump in the METR by
seven percentage points. These calculations are sensitive to the holding period for shares and
can be influenced by the time it takes for the investor to exhaust the lifetime capital gains
exemption. The calculation is based on a 20-year holding period for shares—a lower holding
period leads to a higher capital gains tax rate and therefore a higher METR. The calculations
also depend on an assumption that only one entrepreneur owns the company and the
entrepreneur does not own or has not owned other small businesses. Otherwise, the jump in the
METR as the lifetime capital gains exemption is exhausted will vary from that for the asset
size that we have characterized.
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FIGURE 1 Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Small Business
The Base Case: 5% Pre-tax Profit-to-Asset Ratio, 
29% Debt-to-Asset Ratio and 40% Dividend Payout Ratio
The jump in the METR can be understood as follows. The METR is the wedge between the
pre-tax (R) and after-tax (r) rate of return on capital that an investor has to receive to justify
making an investment. In symbols:
METR= (R - r) /R  or 
R = r / (1 - METR).  
If, for example, investors need a rate of return on five percent15 and the METR is 27 percent,
the required pre-tax rate of return on capital is 6.85 percent. If the METR becomes 35 percent,
the required pre-tax rate of return on capital becomes 7.7 percent.   Projects that were
acceptable with pre-tax rates of return more than 6.85 percent but less than 7.7 percent would
be given up when the firm grows larger. This can deter the growth of businesses.
Given that the majority of small corporations have total assets well below $1 million, Figure 1
implies that the threshold effect of the SBD hinders a minority of small firms that invest a
relatively large amount of capital, generate a relatively large amount of revenue and hence
have a much greater potential to grow their business. On the other hand, the fact that the
majority of small business stays extremely small16 may have little to do with the objective of
growing their businesses, but much to do with tax savings arising from the SBD. 
The threshold especially matters when small business owners reinvest their profits, as opposed
to when they take out dividends. Given that combined corporate and personal taxes on
dividends at the top corporate rate do not deviate far from the corresponding personal tax rates,
small businesses that fully payout profits in the form of dividends do not face a large jump in
the marginal effective tax rate (refer to Sub-section E and Figure 5 below).
15 All rates of return are expressed net of risk costs. The cost of risk is reduced by taxation to the extent governments
share losses through carry-back and carry-forward provisions for losses and unused credits.
16 According to Statistics Canada, “the majority of the small corporations (60 percent) deploy under $300,000 in total
assets.” See L. Pelot, “A Profile of Small Business Across Canada,” Insights on, Vol. 2, No. 3, November 1998.
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/61f0019x/61f0019x1997004-eng.pdf.
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When small business reinvests profits, owners could take several actions to avoid the higher
corporate income tax rate on profits. The owner could take salary income when the threshold is
reached with the salary deducted at the corporate level and fully taxed at the personal level. The
disadvantage is that the small business becomes more constrained in its available cash flow to
finance capital expansion. Alternatively, the owner could lend money to the corporation—the
interest payments are deductible at the corporate level although fully taxed at the personal level.
This might provide some additional capital for expansion from the owner’s personal wealth. 
Unfortunately, there are no data available to test for threshold impacts that would arise with
asset size or profit limits. To test whether the threshold matters, it would be necessary to
evaluate the extent to which dividends and/or salary are paid to owners at the threshold (the
jump is then avoided), debt policy (that mitigates the impact of the jump) and the future profits
that would be gained from expansion that would encourage the company to grow anyway for
non-tax reasons.  
B. The Provincial Diversity of METRs on Small Business
Figure 2 shows the diversity of provincial METRs on small business. With the 5 percent pre-
tax profit ratio, the METR in the majority of provinces shows the threshold effect that arises
when asset size exceeds $10 million and hence assumed taxable profits exceed $500,000.
The exceptions are Manitoba and Nova Scotia where the revenue threshold for the SBD is
$400,000. For these two provinces, the first turning point occurs with an asset size of
$8 million (and hence assumed profit of $400,000), after which the provincial corporate
income tax rates jump by 12 and 11 percentage points respectively, which contributes to the
jump in the METRs by seven and nine percentage points respectively. 
FIGURE 2 Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Small Business 
The Base Case by Province
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The most intriguing finding from Figure 2 is that Manitoba and PEI, the two provinces with
the most generous SBD as implied by the lowest tax rate for small business (zero and one
percent respectively), show the highest METR for small business. The reason for such a
counter-intuitive outcome is that, despite the generous SBD, the provincial sales tax on capital
purchases contributes to a rather high tax cost on capital investment by all firms regardless of
their sizes. Saskatchewan appears to be the third-highest taxed province for small business also
because of its sales tax on capital purchases. If these three provinces were to follow the other
provinces and harmonize their sales taxes with the federal GST, their METR on small business
could drop by about 10 to 20 percentage points, which in turn could collectively lower the
national average METR on small business by more than one percentage point. 
The other three Atlantic provinces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Nova Scotia) have the
lowest taxes for small business among all the provinces, a result arising from the federal
investment tax credit that is available to the Atlantic region.
Among other provinces, the general link between the statutory corporate income tax rate and
the METR prevails. That is, given the almost identical tax provisions other than provincial
income tax rates, the lower the provincial income tax rate, the lower the METR (e.g., Alberta
and BC).  
C. The Variation of Income Thresholds for SBD
To illustrate the true impact of the recent trend in raising the income threshold to “facilitate”
small business growth, Figure 3 provides a variation of our base case with a range of income
thresholds from $200,000 (which applied pre-2005) to $500,000 (since 2009).
FIGURE 3 Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Small Business
Simulation 1: The Base Case with Varying Revenue Ceilings for Small Business Deduction
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As the figure shows, raising the income thresholds for the SBD does not deal with the
threshold effect of the SBD but moves the turning point beyond which the threshold effect
incurs. If the purpose is to encourage small business to grow, raising the income threshold does
not seem to do the job. Because any given income threshold would always appear to be a curb
on growing business by a certain group of small businesses, or at a certain stage of growth for
a small firm, a lower threshold curbs growth in lower-income firms and a higher threshold
curbs growth of higher-income firms. The threshold effect does not disappear, but the integrity
of the tax system is further impaired. 
As noted by the Mintz Committee, “over 80 percent of small businesses earn less than
$100,000 in income” and “many small corporations with $200,000 or more of annual business
profits are owned by wealthy individuals,” hence the Mintz Committee’s conclusion that the
fairness of raising revenue ceilings blindly “would be questionable.”  More importantly,
“increasing the small business limit would introduce additional non-neutralities and distortions
into the system.”  
D. The Variation of the Pre-Tax Profit Rate
One of the arguments for raising the income threshold for the SBD is to support highly
profitable firms with substantial growth potential. Our simulation will show this argument is
unjustified.
As explained earlier, the assumption with respect to the pre-tax profit rate is critical to our
calculation of METR on small business. For a given size of assets, the higher the pre-tax profit
rate, the sooner a small firm may exceed the income threshold for the SBD and start paying the
general and higher corporate income tax rate. 
Figure 4 presents four cases, each having pre-tax profit ratios of four percent, five percent, six
percent and 10 percent, respectively. In the case of a pre-tax profit rate of four percent, the
threshold effect will not occur until the firm grows its investment beyond $12.5 million and
hence earns pre-tax revenue beyond $500,000. On the other end of the scale, with a pre-tax
profit ratio of 10 percent, the firm will start losing its SBD benefit as soon as its assets exceed
$5 million (corresponding to pre-tax earnings exceeding $500,000). 
This simulation shows that a higher income threshold preserves the SBD benefit longer for all
firms, but more so for less profitable ones (hence those with lower potential for growth). That
is, a higher income threshold provides a longer tax advantage for less profitable firms as
compared to those that are highly profitable. If profitability indicates growth potential, then it
becomes clear that, the higher the income threshold, the longer a slow-growing small business
can continue to benefit from the SBD.
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FIGURE 4 Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Small Business
Simulation 2: 29% Debt-to-Asset Ratio, 40% Dividend Payout Ratio and Varying Pre-tax Profit-to-Asset 
Ratios
It is also noteworthy that the rule for clawing back the SBD within the asset range of $10 million
- $15 million plays a part in determining the METR for slow-growing firms (e.g., with a pre-
tax profit rate of 4 percent). That is, slow-growing firms hit the minimum capital threshold
earlier than the income threshold, but the incremental capital threshold kicks in gradually along
with the clawback mechanism. Therefore, the threshold effect for slow-growing firms does not
appear as steep as that for fast-growing firms. 
E. Variation of the Dividend Payout Ratio
By varying the dividend payout ratio from zero to 100 percent, Figure 5 shows convincingly
that the SBD tax system appears to be “pro growth” for small business by taxing their
dividends more heavily than their retained earnings. That is, the higher the dividend payout
ratio (e.g., 100 percent versus zero percent) and hence the less a firm retains earnings for
growing its business, the higher the marginal effective tax rate on the entrepreneur, since
dividends are more highly taxed than capital gains that are exempt.  But here is the catch: the
lower the dividend payout ratio (e.g., zero percent vs. 40 percent) and hence the more a firm
retains earnings for growing its business, the earlier the firm will exhaust its lifetime capital
gains exemption and start paying capital gains tax, at which point the third threshold effect
occurs. Therefore, a small business is faced with a double-edged sword on its path of growth,
which also encourages more wasteful tax planning should a principal purpose of setting up a
small corporation be to save on taxes.
It is interesting to observe that, with a 100 percent dividend payout ratio, a small business may
be highly taxed but with a minimum threshold effect. That is, with the 100-percent payout
ratio, when the capital size exceeds $10 million and hence profit exceeds the income threshold
of $500,000, the METR rises only by 2.4 percentage points, the smallest threshold effect from
all our METR simulations. This is achieved by the specially designed dividend tax credit
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regime that ensures “ineligible” dividends are more highly taxed than “eligible” dividends.
As described earlier, eligible dividends are those distributed from income subject to the general
corporate income tax while ineligible dividends are distributed from income subject to the
reduced corporate tax rate under the SBD. Obviously, this specially designed dividend tax
credit regime is intended to integrate corporate and personal taxes so as to avoid double
taxation of dividends that would otherwise occur. However, as usual, such sophisticated and
well-intended tax design complicates our tax system and increases administrative and
compliance costs for both taxpayers and tax administrators. This tax complication can be
avoided by eliminating the SBD so as to tax all corporations equally.
FIGURE 5  Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Small Business
Simulation 3: 5% Pre-tax Profit-to-Asset Ratio, 29% Debt-to-Asset Ratio and Varying Dividend Payout Ratios 
F. Variation of Debt-to-Asset Ratios
One of the main arguments for having a SBD is the disadvantage in financial accessibility
encountered by small business. While the reasons for the statistically lower debt-to-asset ratio
for small business (compared to large firms) are somewhat unclear,17 it is technically justifiable
to use the debt-to-asset ratio to reflect the borrowing power of small business. Figure 6
presents a METR simulation for small business with varying debt-to-asset ratios. 
17 In an extreme case, as categorized by Crawford and Freedman (note 8), some small businesses might be simply seen
as “non-entrepreneurial lifestyle businesses” which have no need to raise funds through borrowing.
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FIGURE 6 Marginal Effective Tax Rate on Small Business
Simulation 4: 5% Pre-tax Profit-to-Asset Ratio, 40% Dividend Payout Ratio and Varying Debt-to-Asset Ratios 
As the figure shows, the higher the debt-to-asset ratio (e.g., 50 percent), the lower the METR
for small business will be and vice versa (e.g., compared to a 10 percent debt-to-asset ratio).18
This simulation at least illustrates that a tax reduction is not the only remedy for a financing
disadvantage facing small business. For example, without advocating it due to the likely moral
hazard problems that would ensue, directly reducing the possible financial barriers to small
business (e.g., through a government loan guarantee) might be an option that may aid the effort
to relieve our tax system from a duty of assisting small firms. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The overall aim of tax policy is to levy taxes in an efficient and fair manner with minimal
compliance and administrative costs.  
An efficient tax system is one that minimizes distortions in the decisions made by households
and businesses with respect to the best use of economic resources. This would normally imply
that taxes should be levied at similar rates on goods, services, businesses and labour among
competing uses. At times, taxes might be used as an alternative to other public policies (e.g.,
government subsidies, regulations and spending programs) to influence economic behaviour.
For example, in the case of pollution or research and development, markets fail to achieve an
efficient allocation of resources when individuals or businesses do not take into account the
beneficial (innovation) or harmful (pollution) spillover impact of their decisions on other parts
of the economy. However, a case-by-case assessment is needed to best judge which type of
policy (spending, tax reductions or regulation) are best able to influence economic activity.  
18 In this model, personal taxes on interest income are irrelevant since it is assumed that financing is provided by
banks—borrowing costs are determined by international capital markets (Canadian personal taxes are therefore
irrelevant in this case). If, however, entrepreneurs provided debt financing, the estimated effective tax rates on capital
would include personal taxes on borrowed funds. Such personal taxes are higher than dividend and capital gains taxes
paid on equity income by investors, the latter two being reduced by the dividend tax credit and capital gains exclusion.
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Fairness is achieved by imposing similar burdens on individuals with similar resources. It
might also imply levying different burdens on individuals when their ability to pay taxes
differs. Fairness is best achieved by varying taxes paid by individuals since businesses can be
owned by both the rich and the poor. Thus, in the interest of fairness, business taxes are best
levied at similar rates across business activities while varying personal tax rates to accomplish
fairness objectives.
The administrative costs for governments and compliance costs for taxpayers are minimized by
keeping taxes as neutral and as simple as possible. The more complex the tax provisions, the
greater the administrative and compliance costs since more “boundaries” must be defined and
checked to determine the eligibility of a taxpayer’s activities for special consideration.  
More specifically, the role of the corporate tax is most efficient, fair and least costly in terms of
administrative and compliance costs when it is levied at a single rate on a neutral, broad base.  
A. Specific Issues Related to Small Business
Preferential taxation on small business has been suggested for two important reasons.  
First, the administrative and compliance costs associated with the tax system are a greater
burden on smaller businesses compared to larger companies. Certainly, Vaillancourt and
Clemons provide conclusive evidence to suggest that the cost of compliance declines relative
to firms’ assets or revenue size.19 However, as these authors point out, compliance costs are
substantial for both large and small firms, suggesting that broad reforms to simplify the tax
system should certainly be an important consideration for tax policy to the benefit of all firms
in the economy.
Second, small businesses have less access to international and domestic capital markets,
forcing entrepreneurs to rely on more selective financing sources including banks, family and
friends. Whether liquidity-constrained small businesses are faced with credit limitations is not
easily proven, since they are able to access capital markets through financial institutions whose
role is to match the interests of borrowers and lenders in markets. Undoubtedly, the economic
cost of servicing loans is more expensive for small compared to large businesses (just as are
other input costs), but this does not provide a basis for specific intervention.
Probably the most important argument in favour of small business support is with respect to
information asymmetries in financial markets whereby smaller firms, being more reliant on
funds from external sources, face higher financing costs even if they have good-quality
projects.20 Research on this topic has spawned a rich literature on imperfect information that
shows that markets can work in the presence of imperfect information if people trust signals
about credit quality such as financial leverage, entrepreneurial stake in investments, dividend
policy, etc. Signals work if good suppliers can separate themselves from the “lemons”—a
minimal condition needed for separation being that the signal is more expensive for the lemons
to adopt compared to the better quality companies. Nonetheless, even with separation of the
good from the bad, inefficiency is present since bad-quality companies operating in the market
make it more expensive for good quality ones to issue securities to less informed investors. 
19 F. Vaillancourt and J. Clemons, “Compliance and Administrative Costs of Taxation in Canada,” in The Impact and
Cost of Taxation in Canada: Case for a Flat Tax, ed. by J. Clemens, Fraser Institute, 2008, 55-102.
20 Markets can breakdown if good firms cannot separate themselves from the bad.  See G. Akerlof, “The Market for
Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 48(3), 1970, pp. 488-500.
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In the past several years, several disparate papers on policy applications in models with
imperfect information have provided a reasoned approach to improve the functioning of
markets.21 The key role of regulations or fiscal policies is that they should make it harder for
bad players to mimic good players. In other words, it is important to “tax” and not “subsidize”
signals so that good players are less squeezed out of the market by lemons.  For example, new
equity financing subsidies actually could worsen information asymmetries since they would
make it easier for bad firms to copy good firms (the good firms need less new equity financing
since they have stronger cash flows and signal this strength through greater use of retained
earnings). On the other hand, investment credits or allowances make it easier for good firms to
separate themselves from poorer quality companies.   
B. Some Practical Recommendations
A basic principle underlying our recommendations is to adopt policies that assist small
businesses to overcome economic barriers to their growth and avoid tax policies that
themselves create those barriers. We specifically suggest replacing the small business tax
deduction and lifetime capital gains exemption with better incentives that promote rather than
hinder growth. Three specific tax initiatives are suggested:
• Incentives for investment in depreciable assets: To encourage small businesses to grow
without creating tax barriers to growth, the government could adopt expensing of capital up
to a certain limit that would be available to all firms. For example, to maintain $1 million
capital stock, annual capital investment would need to be about $70,000 (assuming an
average depreciation rate of seven percent). If the first $70,000 of capital expenditure were
expensed rather than depreciated for tax purposes, small businesses would be able to benefit
from a lower tax cost until they build up their capital to a reasonable level. The only
difference is that this incentive would be available to both large and small companies.
When companies get larger there would be no clawback of the benefit.
This approach to providing investment incentive for small business has been used in the
United Kingdom. While it does have a higher fiscal cost since the incentive is available to
all businesses, it imposes a smaller “wall” since it would be immaterial to large and growth-
oriented businesses.
• Capital gains incentive for small business going public: Canadian small business
capital gains tax policy is geared towards private companies. As soon as companies become
public, they lose many of the tax benefits they have been entitled to including the small
business tax deduction and lifetime capital gains exemption (the latter can be realized by
owners crystallizing their gains at conversion).22 In other words, incentives create a barrier
to growth when firms become public.   
As an alternative to the lifetime capital gains exemption, we recommend a 50 percent
reduction in capital gains tax for shares issued by small businesses when they become
public. The purchaser would have to hold the shares for five years.  Qualifying shares could
be limited to small businesses with less than $50 million in assets. The US has had a similar
tax incentive structured to help small businesses grow in this manner.    
21 J. Mintz, “Policy Perspectives on Capital Market Issues,” in Capital Market Issues, ed. by P. Halpern, University of
Calgary Press, 1997, pp. 729-752.
22 The lifetime capital gains exemption has been used by large public companies to provide additional benefits to
specific shareholders. For example, a private company is established for manager-shareholders to receive income
from the corporation. Each shareholder of the private company can then claim the $750,000 capital gains exemption.
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• Reducing the lock-in effect of capital gains taxes – capital gains tax deferral
accounts: One of the problems with capital gains taxes, which applies only when assets are
divested, is that they encourage people to hold assets rather than rolling them over into
alternative investments. The “lock-in” effect of capital gains taxes can therefore undermine
economic efficiency if people continue holding assets rather than shifting to those
investments with better economic returns. It also limits the ability of small business owners
to cash out their gains, thereby making exit harder. The current capital gains exemption for
shares in private companies and farm and fishing property helps small business owners to
cash out but it also creates a barrier to growth as we have already discussed.
At present, investors in small businesses can defer capital gains on the sale of small
business shares by purchasing shares of another small business within a specified time
period. The intent of the provision has been to enable small business owners to readjust
their portfolios and avoid capital gains taxes that would be triggered at the time of the sale.
While this provision does provide some relief, it is clearly very limited in scope. It does not
help small business owners who choose to exit a business by investing proceeds in the
market rather than looking for another small business venture. It also discriminates against
investors in other types of businesses who look to reallocate their portfolios to achieve
better returns.
We would recommend a more general approach whereby Canadian investors in small
businesses would be able to reinvest proceeds in a “capital gains tax deferral account”
whereby no capital gains tax is paid until the asset is sold for other purposes than investing
generally.23 In the capital gains deferral account, any assets that yield taxable capital gains
(such as investments in real estate, public corporation securities, etc.) would enable
entrepreneurs and other investors to roll over assets on a deferral basis until the assets are
disposed of. While we would suggest developing the capital gains deferral account to apply
widely to all investors, it could be limited to owners of smaller public and private
corporations on a limited basis to reduce the fiscal cost of the incentive.  
The abolition of the lifetime capital gains exemption would reduce the cost of the initiative.
Also, the tax deferral account would reduce the need to have a capital gains tax incentive to
encourage small businesses to go public as discussed above, since investors could defer
capital gains taxes altogether when firms become public by placing the assets in the capital
gains tax deferral account. 
CONCLUSION
By illustrating the threshold effect of the Canadian small business tax regime under varying
business scenarios, our METR simulations do not support the pro-growth argument for the
small business deduction in general and the argument for increasing the income threshold for
the SBD in particular. Instead, our simulations show that, 
- As long as there is a specified size for the SBD, the threshold effect on business growth is
unavoidable regardless of the level of income or capital threshold set for the SBD
(Figures 1 and 3). 
23 Op cit supra note 13. 
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- A higher income threshold provides a greater tax advantage for less profitable firms as
compared to those that are highly profitable and hence have greater growth potential
(Figure 4).  
- The inconsistency in tax design (e.g., intending to support small firms on the one hand, but
demonstrating insensitivity to the overall tax environment for business in general) should be
dealt with more urgently than by single-mindedly enhancing the SBD—with the results
shown by some high provincial METRs in Figure 2 (e.g., the highest provincial METRs in
PEI and Manitoba respectively).  
- The current SBD regime complicates our business tax system. In particular, in conjunction
with the well-intended dividend tax credit regime, it does not add much value to tax
efficiency but causes greater compliance and administrative costs and encourages more
wasteful tax planning (Figure 5).
- Several changes to the tax system could be adopted that would provide important relief
especially for small businesses without creating new tax barriers. We include in our
recommendations (i) expensing of capital investment up to a limit, (ii) a capital gains tax
incentive for companies to go public and (iii) a capital gains tax deferral account.  
In conclusion, in order to justify the SBD and further reform our small business tax regime, the
common reasoning for having the SBD, such as the postulated existence of capital market
failure that hampers the financing capacity of small businesses, and the regressivity of
compliance costs and asymmetry of profits and losses faced by small businesses, requires a
thorough investigation. Such investigation will provide a knowledge foundation for reforming
our SBD regime as an integral part of the overall tax system. 
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APPENDIX A:
TAX PROVISIONS AFFECTING SMALL BUSINESSES
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Federal Provincial
Small Business
Deduction
Research and
Development Tax
Credit
Tax Holidays
Capital Taxes (non-
financial) as of 2010
Graduated Personal
Income Tax Schedule
Dividend Tax Credit
Lifetime Capital
Gains Exemption
Capital Gain 
Deferral
• The federal corporate tax rate on CCPCs with
a taxable capital below $10 million is
reduced to 11 percent on active business
income up to $500,000.
• The small business deduction is restricted on
a straight-line basis for such CCPCs with
taxable capital in excess of $10 million and
below $15 million, beyond which the
deduction is eliminated entirely.
• Higher credit at 35 percent instead of
20 percent for smaller businesses.
• Annually limited to $3 million of R&D
expenditure.
• Credit for small business refundable at
100 percent (current expenses) and
40 percent (capital expenses)
• Limit phased out between $500,000 and
$800,000 expenditure or $10 to $50 million
in taxable capital.
N/A
Rates vary by income.
Two dividend tax credits – 15 percent (2012)
for eligible dividends and 13.33 percent for
ineligible dividends to reflect low small
business rate. 
Capital gains on the disposition of shares in a
CCPC are exempt from tax (as of 2010, equal
to $750,000).  Business must hold at least 90
percent of assets in Canada and derive over
half of income from active business income.
Deferral of capital gains on shares held in a
small business if replaced by another small
business investment. Small businesses
restricted to less than $50 million in asset size
at times shares are issued.
• Provincial corporate income tax rates on CCPCs
are reduced in all provinces to a lower rate up
to $500,000 in business income except
thresholds lower in Manitoba and Nova Scotia
($400,000).
• Higher credit rate for smaller firms in Ontario
(innovation credit) and Quebec. Alberta limits its
10 percent credit to the 
• Ontario innovation credit is 10 percent with
limits similar to federal limits for small
businesses.
• Quebec credit of 37.5 percent for companies
less than $50 million in assets and R&D wage
costs below $3 million. Rate phased down to
17.5 percent for assets between $50 and $75
million assets.
Holidays given for targeted activities. Specific to
CCPCs are the following: 
• Newfoundland and Labrador (5 years) 
• Nova Scotia (3 years)
• Quebec manufacturing in remote areas
(75 percent of income below $20 million paid-
up capital)
Only Quebec and Nova Scotia, impose such a tax
on capital above a certain threshold. They are also
phasing out capital taxes by 2012.
Rates vary by income.
Similar to federal level with credit rates with rates
varying by province.
Same
Same
CORPORATE TAX PROVISIONS
PERSONAL TAX PROVISIONS
Source: Tax and Economic Growth Program, University of Calgary (review of tax statutes and government websites)
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PERSONAL TAX PROVISIONS cont’d
Labour Sponsored
Venture Capital
Credit
Stock Options
(CCPC)
Equity Tax Credits
for Investors
Capital Losses
Value-Added Taxes
Provincial payroll
taxes
• Tax credit for investments in labour-
sponsored venture capital firms equal to
15 percent of amount up to $5000.
• Investments by LSVCC in small businesses
with less than $10 million in assets are
counted 1.5 the amount towards the
60 percent business investment requirement.
Employment benefits arising from the exercise
of stock options issued by a CCPC to an arm’s
length employee are deferred for tax purposes
until the shares are sold.  
None
Capital losses on the sale of shares or bonds
held in Canadian-controlled small businesses
may be deducted from any source of income
GST: Small trader exemption for sales less than
$30000. Quick method (remit 3/5 of
collections with no input tax credits) for
businesses with less than $200,000
N/A
Most provinces have a similar credit except for
Ontario (being phased out although a new retail
credit has been introduced) and Alberta.
Same
• Quebec SMB Growth Plan – deduction for
investments with a minimum of three years in
shares of enterprises with less than $100
million in assets.  
• Alberta stock savings plan provides a tax credit
for investments in eligible emerging or
expanding companies. 
• New Brunswick small business investor credit of
30 percent (maximum credit of $24,000) is
provided for equity investments held for four
years in small businesses with less than $40
million in assets.
• Nova Scotia’s equity tax credit of 30 percent
(maximum credit of $15,000) in small
businesses of less than $25 million assets.
Additional credits for community development
initiatives.
• Newfoundland and Labrador provide a
20 percent (35 percent outside of northeast
Avalon) direct-equity tax credit for small
business investments (less than $20 million in
assets or 50 full-time employees) in selected
industries.
• Yukon provides a small business investment tax
credit at 25 percent (maximum $25,000) for
Yukon businesses of less than $25 million in
capitalization.
• Manitoba provides an equity tax credit for
investors of five percent up to $1,500 (up to
June 2008) and community enterprise tax credit
(30 percent up to $9,000).
Same
• HST in British Columbia, Ontario, Nova Scotia,
New Brunswick and Newfoundland & Labrador –
similar exemptions
• Quebec Sales Tax: Small trader exemption same
as federal GST.
Provinces apply employer payroll taxes with
exemptions or low rates for employers with smaller
payroll costs.
SALES TAXES
PAYROLL TAXES
Federal Provincial
APPENDIX B
Financial Performance Indicators for Canadian Businesses 
(Non-Financial Industries, excluding Holding Companies and Head Offices)
Return on net operating assets 8.8 9.6 11.6
Pre-tax profit to assets  3.9 4.8 6.1
Return on capital employed 8.3 9.1 10.9
Return on equity 1 17.1 18.8 21.1
Debt-to-equity 1 0.4 0.4 0.4
Liability to assets 0.8 0.8 0.8
1 Firms with zero or negative equity are excluded from the “Return on equity” and “Debt-to-equity” ratios.
Definitions of any of the above may be found at:
http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/61-219-XIE/2006000/technote5.htm
Total revenue 618,436
Cost of goods sold 406,734
Net profit/ loss before tax 36,074
Current assets 199,193
Total assets 523,048
Current liabilities 120,902
Total liabilities 277,534
Retained earnings 135,577
Total equity 245,515
Source: Statistics Canada, 61-219-XIE.
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Financial ratios (average, all firms with revenue under $5 million) 2004 2005 2006
Income/Balance Sheet Data Average (in dollars)
APPENDIX C
METHODOLOGY FOR ESTIMATING MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES
This appendix is provided to those readers who are interested in knowing the formulas used for
calculating marginal effective tax rates on capital at the small business level. The standard
method used to estimate marginal effective tax rates is extensively modified to reflect changing
tax rates as exemplified by the Canadian tax structure.24 A firm invests in capital until the rate
of return on capital is equal to the depreciation, financing and tax costs of holding capital. The
small business borrows debt from third parties (e.g., banks).  The small business owner funds
equity (we assume there is only one owner in the model).
Given that the corporate and personal tax rates rise with income and the size of the firm, the
investor decisions account for shifts in tax rates. The most important change is the rise in the
corporate income tax rate when the small business becomes taxed as a regular business. This
issue is similar to modeling tax-loss companies when tax rates increase after the losses are
expired (with the time taken to reach the threshold depending on asset size or profits). This is a
fairly complicated model whereby the time-value of tax depreciation deductions increases as
the firm reaches the date in which it becomes taxable. The cost of investing one year early is to
give up higher tax depreciation allowances after the firm reaches a higher corporate income tax
rate. If the firm always expects to remain below the threshold, the model is simplified since the
tax rates are not expected to change.  
We do not provide the full derivation of the model. However, readers may consult earlier work
relevant to this type of problem.25
The formulas derived from the theoretical model incorporate miscellaneous taxes such as
capital taxes and sales taxes on capital purchases. Following are the general formulas used in
this study. Note that these formulas are not indexed for time (given shifts in tax rates) except in
cases when the time factors are relevant for definition. For simplicity, we provide formulas for
changes in corporate tax rates only (not for changes in personal tax rates that would affect the
discount rate for evaluating firm investments).
(I) MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATE (t)
The marginal effective tax rate on a given type of capital is defined as the proportional
difference between the gross-of-tax rate of return (rG) required by a firm and the net-of-tax rate
of return (rN) required by the equity investor.  rG is the marginal revenue product (or user cost
of capital, in equilibrium) net of economic depreciation. The after-tax rate of return is the
return on equity securities held by the owner. Thus, the effective tax rate (t) is defined as
t = (rG - rN) / rG
24 For example, for countries levying gross-receipts tax, which does not exist in Canada, formulas presented in this
appendix would need to be modified.
25 See Jack M. Mintz, “Tax Holidays and Investment,” World Bank Economic Review, 4, No. 1, 1990, 81-102.
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(II) THE NET-OF-TAX RATE OF RETURN ON CAPITAL (rN)
The net-of-tax rate of return on capital is defined by the formula 
rN = ßi + (1 - ß) ρ (1 - m) - π
whereby i is the interest rate on debt financing (we ignore personal taxes on third-party debt
which is assumed to be provided by banks), ρ is pre-personal tax return on equity, m weighted
average personal tax rates on dividends and capital gains (accrual-equivalent basis) and π is the
rate of inflation. The after-tax return on equity, adjusted for inflation, ρ(1 - m) - π,  is the after-
tax rate of return on capital required by the small business owner, which would be at least
equal to the after-tax returns available on alternative investment opportunities.
(III) THE REAL COST OF FINANCING (rf)
The real cost of financing (rf) for the small business is one of the main components of cost of
capital for the small business corporation, or gross-of-tax rate of return (rG) on capital. The real
cost of financing (rf) is defined by 
rf = ßi (1 - U) + (1 - ß) ρ - π
with  ß = the ratio of debt to assets ratio,  i = cost of debt,  U = the statutory corporate income
tax rate (which depends on size),  ρ = cost of equity, and  π = inflation rate. That is, the cost of
financing for the firm is the weighted-average cost of financing net of the inflation rate. Note
that the cost of finance will shift in time due to two factors—higher corporate income tax rates
and a higher personal tax rate on equity income.  
(IV) THE GROSS-OF-TAX RATE OF RETURN (rG) ON CAPITAL
A.  Depreciable assets (i.e. buildings and machinery and equipment)
rG = (δ + rf) (1 + z) (1 - k){1 - At)} / (1 - Ut) + (1 + rf + π) (At - At-1) / (1 - Ut) for t < T 
and 
rG = (δ + rf) (1 + z) (1 - k) [1 - A](1 - U) - δ for t > T (4)
with the present value of tax benefits from depreciation deductions net of capital tax payments,
A, equal to 
At = Σs=t ∞ [(1 + Rs)-(s-t) {Ut α(1 - α)-(s-t)]- - τ (1 - Ut) (1 - δ)-(s-t)} for t < T. 
A = Uα/(α + rf + π) - τ (1-U) / (δ + rf + π)  for t > T.
Where  rf = real cost of financing as defined above,  δ = economic depreciation rate,
k = investment tax credit rate,  τ = capital tax rate,  α = tax depreciation rate and  z is the sales
tax rate on capital purchases. Prior to full taxation, the present value of tax depreciation
allowances changes reflecting shifts in corporate tax rates over time. 
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B.  Inventory
rG = (rf + Uπ) / (1 - U) + τ
C.  Land
rG = rf[1 + τ (1 - U) / (rf + π)] / (1 - U)
Important Limitation: In our calculations, the time taken to reach the threshold is unknown
and can be avoided if certain financing decisions are used. For empirical purposes, the present
value of tax depreciation allowances changes little, (At is close enough to At-1), thereby
simplifying calculations of effective tax rates. The estimates provided in the figures result in
somewhat lower marginal effective tax rate calculations during the low-tax rate period when
we ignore the changes in the tax value of depreciation allowances. 
(V) AGGREGATION
The METR for a given industry is the proportional difference between the weighted average of
the before-tax rate of return by as set type and the after-tax rate of return; the latter is the same
across asset types within a given sector. That is, the marginal effective tax rate for the ith
industry ti.  ti is calculated as following:
ti = (Σj rGij wij - rNi) /Σj rGij wij (7)
where j denotes asset type (i.e. investments in buildings, machinery, inventories, and land), and
wij denotes the weight of asset type j in industry i.
28
About the Authors
Dr. Jack Mintz
The James S. & Barbara A. Palmer Chair in Public Policy
Jack M. Mintz was appointed the Palmer Chair in Public Policy at the University of Calgary in January 2008.
Widely published in the field of public economics, he was touted in a 2004 UK magazine publication as one of the world’s most
influential tax experts. He serves as an Associate Editor of International Tax and Public Finance and the Canadian Tax
Journal, and is a research fellow of CESifo, Munich, Germany, and the Centre for Business Taxation Institute, Oxford University.
He is a regular contributor to Canadian Business and the National Post, and has frequently published articles in other print
media.
Dr. Mintz presently serves on several boards including Brookfield Asset Management, Imperial Oil Limited, Morneau Shepell,
and Royal Ontario Museum. He was also appointed by the Federal Minister of Finance to the Economic Advisory Council to
advise on economic planning and served as research director for the Federal-Provincial Minister’s Working Group on
Retirement Income Research.  
Dr. Mintz held the position of Professor of Business Economics at the Rotman School of Business from 1989-2007 and
Department of Economics at Queen’s University, Kingston, 1978-1989.  He was a Visiting Professor, New York University Law
School, 2007; President and CEO of the C.D. Howe Institute from 1999-2006; Clifford Clark Visiting Economist at the
Department of Finance, Ottawa; Chair of the federal government’s Technical Committee on Business Taxation in 1996 and
1997; and Associate Dean (Academic) of the Faculty of Management, University of Toronto, 1993-1995.  He was founding
Editor-in-Chief of International Tax and Public Finance, published by Kluwer Academic Publishers from 1994-2001, and
recently chaired the Alberta Financial and Investment Policy Advisory Commission reporting to the Alberta Minister of Finance.
In 2002, Dr. Mintz’s book, Most Favored Nation: A Framework for Smart Economic Policy, was winner of the Purvis Prize for
best book in economic policy and runner-up for Donner Prize for best book in public policy. 
Dr. Mintz has consulted widely with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development, the governments of Canada, Alberta, New Brunswick, Ontario, and Saskatchewan, and various
businesses and nonprofit organizations.
Dr. Duanjie Chen is a Research Fellow at The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary. Over the past two decades,
she served as a consultant to various international organizations, national government bodies, and business and
non-profit organizations. She has published numerous articles and papers in the area of public finance.
29
DISTRIBUTION
Our publications are available online at www.policyschool.ca.
DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed in these publications are the authors’
alone and therefore do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the
supporters, staff, or boards of The School of Public Policy.
COPYRIGHT
Copyright © 2011 by The School of Public Policy.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be
reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written
permission except in the case of brief passages quoted in
critical articles and reviews.
ISSN
1919-112x SPP Research Papers (Print)
1919-1138 SPP Research Papers (Online)
DATE OF ISSUE
May 2011
MEDIA INQUIRIES AND INFORMATION
For media inquiries, please contact Morten Paulsen at
403-453-0062. 
Our web site, www.policyschool.ca, contains more information
about The School’s events, publications, and staff.
DEVELOPMENT
For information about contributing to The School of Public
Policy, please contact Candice Naylen by telephone at
403-210-7099 or by e-mail at cnaylen@ucalgary.ca.
EDITOR
Timothy Giannuzzi
ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION
The School of Public Policy Research Papers provide in-depth, evidence-based assessments and recommendations on a
range of public policy issues. Research Papers are put through a stringent peer review process prior to being made available
to academics, policy makers, the media and the public at large. Views expressed in The School of Public Policy Research
Papers are the opinions of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the view of The School of Public Policy.
OUR MANDATE
The University of Calgary is home to scholars in 16 faculties (offering more than 80 academic programs) and 36 Research
Institutes and Centres including The School of Public Policy. Under the direction of Jack Mintz, Palmer Chair in Public Policy,
and supported by more than 100 academics and researchers, the work of The School of Public Policy and its students
contributes to a more meaningful and informed public debate on fiscal, social, energy, environmental and international
issues to improve Canada’s and Alberta’s economic and social performance.
The School of Public Policy achieves its objectives through fostering ongoing partnerships with federal, provincial, state and
municipal governments, industry associations, NGOs, and leading academic institutions internationally. Foreign Investment
Advisory Committee of the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, Finance Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada, and Government of Alberta, are just some of the partners already engaged with the School’s
activities. 
For those in government, The School of Public Policy helps to build capacity and assists in the training of public servants
through degree and non-degree programs that are critical for an effective public service in Canada. For those outside of the
public sector, its programs enhance the effectiveness of public policy, providing a better understanding of the objectives and
limitations faced by governments in the application of legislation.
30
31
RECENT PUBLICATIONS BY THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY
IS THIS THE END OF THE TORY DYNASTY? THE WILDROSE ALLIANCE IN ALBERTA POLITICS 
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/wildrose%20online%20final3.pdf
Anthony M. Sayers & David K. Stewart | May 2011
CANADA’S WORLD CAN GET A LOT BIGGER: THE GROUP OF 20, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND SECURITY 
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/G20%20Heinbecker.pdf
Paul Heinbecker | May 2011
CAN THE G-20 SAVE THE ENVIRONMENT? POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE G-20 ON INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT POLICY 
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/G20%20.pdf
Barry Carin | April 2011
THE IMPACT OF SALES TAX REFORM ON ONTARIO CONSUMERS:
A FIRST LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE 
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/ontario%20sales%20tax%20reform4.pdf
Michael Smart | March 2011
CANADA’S TAX COMPETITIVENESS RANKING: MOVING TO THE AVERAGE BUT BIASED AGAINST SERVICES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/2010tax%20comp%20rank%20online.pdf
Jack Mintz & Duanjie Chen | February 2011
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL BUSINESS TAX REFORMS: A GROWTH AGENDA WITH COMPETITIVE RATES
AND A NEUTRAL TREATMENT OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/fed%20prov%20tax%20reform%201a.pdf
Jack Mintz & Duanjie Chen | January 2011
FIXING THE FISCAL IMBALANCE: TURNING GST REVENUES OVER TO THE PROVINCES IN EXCHANGE
FOR LOWER TRANSFERS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/GST%20Boessenkool%20online3.pdf
Kenneth J. Boessenkool | December 2010
ETHICAL RISKS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES: THE CASE OF ETHANOL IN NORTH AMERICA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/BiofuelsJordaanfinal.pdf
S. M. Jordaan & M. C. Moore | December 2010
CANADA, THE G8, AND THE G20: A CANADIAN APPROACH TO SHAPING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
IN A SHIFTING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/SMITH_finalfinal.pdf
Gordon S. Smith & Peter C. Heap | November 2010
DIFFERENTIATING CANADA: THE FUTURE OF THE CANADA-US RELATIONSHIP
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/dobsonkuzmanovic%20online.pdf
Wendy Dobson & Diana Kuzmanovic | November 2010
EXPANDING CANADA PENSION PLAN RETIREMENT BENEFITS: ASSESSING BIG CPP PROPOSALS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/Kesselman%20CPP%20online.pdf
Jonathan R. Kesselman | October 2010 
SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA AT A CROSSROADS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/files/publicpolicy/Lortie%20online.pdf 
Pierre Lortie | October 2010  
